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The Enduring Local Harm
from Recessions
Brad J. Hershbein and Bryan A. Stuart 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n We study the impacts of 
each recession over the past 50 
years on the economic health 
of metro areas.
 
n Areas that suffer larger 
employment losses during a 
recession never fully recover 
their employment relative to 
less-affected areas.
n Badly hit areas also have 
less population growth, and 
the share of the population 
that is employed, as well as per 
capita income, are lower for 
at least a decade.
n These areas also grow 
relatively older and often 
become less educated, with 
fewer management and 
professional jobs.
n Recessions play a role 
in some areas falling 
economically behind others, 
as employment opportunities 
shift across areas more quickly 
than people do.






Recessions receive enormous attention from 
researchers, policymakers, and the public. 
Most of this attention focuses on short-run, 
nationwide measures like the unemployment 
rate and gross domestic product. Tese outcomes 
are clearly important, but many of the broader 
and longer-lasting consequences of recessions 
remain uncertain. Tis is particularly true for 
how recessions afect local labor markets, such as 
metropolitan areas. 
In particular, do badly afected areas eventually 
recover to be on par with their less-afected peers, 
or is the economic harm sufered during recessions 
persistent, possibly putting severely hit areas on a 
permanently lower trajectory for employment and 
earnings? To answer this question, we examine the 
long-term impacts of fve national recessions— 
from the one in the mid-1970s through the Great 
Recession—on employment, population, earnings, 
and other outcomes for 363 metropolitan areas 
in the United States. Because the severity of each 
recession varied across these areas—some had 
heavy losses in employment while others actually 
gained jobs—we essentially compare worse-hit 
places to less-afected places, tracking outcomes for 
several years afer each recession’s end. 
We fnd that, for every recession, harder-hit 
metropolitan areas sufer long-lasting economic 
harm relative to less-afected areas. Teir paths 
diverge, and the former group falls behind in 
terms of employment, population, employment 
rates, and per capita earnings. Specifcally, an 
area that loses 5 percent of its employment 
during a recession—the typical loss during the 
Great Recession—on average has 6.2 percent less 
employment than it otherwise would have almost 
a decade later. Population also falls, mostly because 
of fewer people moving in rather than more people 
moving out, but this loss is not as large as that for 
employment. Consequently, the share of the adult 
population that is employed falls by 2 percentage 
points, or 1 out of every 50 people. Tis decline in 
the employment rate also leads to a long-term 3.2 
percent drop in per capita earnings. 
Moreover, these persistent economic impacts 
are ofen accompanied by modest, but not trivial, 
changes in the demographic characteristics of 
afected places. Te share of residents aged 65 and 
over increases, while the share aged 15 through 39 
We fnd that, for every recession,
harder-hit metropolitan areas sufer
long-lasting economic harm relative
to less-afected areas. 
falls. Fewer workers are employed in managerial, 
professional, and technical occupations, and more 
are employed in manual and service jobs. Te 
share of residents with a college degree falls. Even 
adjusting for these demographic changes, however, 
the majority of the employment and earnings 
impacts remain. 
Our fndings have important implications for 
the reallocation of economic activity across places, 
labor market dynamism, economic opportunities 
for workers and their children, and optimal policy 
responses. While our social safety net is mostly set 
up to respond to current (or very recent) economic 
conditions, our fnding that recessions have 
enduring impacts on places long afer the national 
economy has recovered suggests that targeting 
aid based on a longer economic history may be 
necessary to preserve economic opportunity for all. 
How Recessions Can Have Long-Lasting 
Local Efects… 
Recessions are periods of depressed economic 
activity, and they coincide with large cuts to 
employment as the demand for labor falls. Tese 
declines generally vary across places because of 
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The Enduring Local Harm from Recessions 
diferences in industry specialization or 
in the types of workers afected, as well 
as the nature of the recession. 
If during a recession most frms 
temporarily lay of workers or reduce 
their hours, then employment, wages, 
and the share of people employed are 
Areas that lost 5 percent more
of their employment during a
recession have employment rates
1–2 percentage points lower,
even up to a decade later. 
likely to quickly revert to previous 
trends once conditions improve. If, 
on the other hand, a recession causes 
employers to change their production 
processes or shut down, there could 
be long-term scarring in a local labor 
market. Tis could also happen if highly 
skilled (and higher-earning) workers 
are more likely to leave for other areas 
not as badly afected, or if the recession 
diverts would-be in-migrants—both 
people and businesses—to other areas. 
Recent research has found support 
for all these possibilities, but has not 
systematically examined the long-
term outcomes of places badly hit by 
recessions. 
…and Vary across Places 
We thus look at places as defned 
by metropolitan areas. Tese 363 areas 
are groups of counties tied together 
by commuting patterns and having an 
urban center of at least 50,000 people. 
Although they exclude rural areas, 
they account for between 66 and 83 
percent of the country’s people and 
jobs between 1969 and 2016. Tese 
metropolitan areas proxy for local labor 
markets, the places in which people 
work and look for jobs. (Our results are 
similar when we examine commuting 
zones, which include rural areas.) 
Figure 1  The Severity of the Great Recession Varied Considerably across Metropolitan Areas 
NOTE: Figure shows the change in the natural log of employment (approximately equal to the percent change in 
employment) between 2007 and 2009 for 363 metropolitan areas (Core-Based Statistical Areas, as defned in 2003 by 
the Ofce of Management and Budget). Areas in darker colors experienced larger employment losses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional data. 
Te severity of recessions varies 
considerably across metropolitan areas. 
Figure 1 shows this variation for the 
last recession we analyze, the Great 
Recession of 2007–2009. We measure 
the local severity of the recession by 
the change in employment between the 
national peak and the national trough— 
in this case between 2007 and 2009—in 
each metropolitan area. On the map, 
areas with darker red shading sufered 
greater proportional employment 
losses. Although some entire states were 
badly afected—Michigan, notably, as 
well as the Sun Belt states of Florida and 
Arizona—there are also several cases 
where neighboring areas fared quite 
diferently, such as Providence and 
Boston, or Pittsburgh and Youngstown. 
Our analysis essentially compares 
the long-term outcomes of places that 
were more severely afected to those 
that were less afected, and we do this 
separately for each of the past fve 
recessions: the ones in 1973–1975, 
1980–1982, 1990–1991, 2001, and 
2007–2009. Of course, the metropolitan 
areas that sufered severe employment 
losses may have difered in several 
ways from those with smaller losses, 
and it is important to control for these 
diferences. Terefore, we are also 
careful to account for diferences in 
prerecession population growth (by 
age group), and we implicitly compare 
metropolitan areas within each of nine 
regions in the country. Moreover, our 
analytical approach, called an event 
study, allows us to confrm that more- 
and less-afected areas were trending 
similarly before the recession; this helps 
ensure that the less-afected areas serve 
as a good comparison to what would 
have happened in the more-afected 
areas had the recession there not been 
as severe. 
Local Recessions Don’t Just Fade Away 
When we implement this approach, 
we fnd that employment doesn’t just 
fall more immediately in harder-hit 
areas (this happens by construction), 
but it remains depressed for at least a 
2 
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decade, and ofen longer. Specifcally, 
we estimate that for every additional 
1 percent drop in employment during 
a recession, employment is between 
0.8 and 1.7 percent lower than it 
otherwise would have been seven to 
nine years afer the recession ended. 
For a Great Recession–sized shock, 
when a 5 percent employment loss was 
not unusual, this means a long-term 
reduction in employment of roughly 
4–8 percent. To be clear, we don’t mean 
that employment is necessarily lower 
than it was before the recession began, 
but that it is lower than it would have 
been in the absence of the recession. 
Put diferently, growth is on a lower 
trajectory. 
We also fnd this same pattern of 
persistently lower growth in an area’s 
population. Every 1 percent greater 
employment loss during a recession 
translates to between 0.3 and 0.7 
percent lower population nearly a 
decade later. One might think this is 
driven by people moving out of badly 
afected areas, but we fnd the opposite. 
Fewer people move away; rather, the 
population loss occurs because fewer 
people subsequently move into hard-hit 
areas, and this efect lasts a long time. 
Moreover, the composition of the 
population shifs, with the population 
of badly hit areas aging and ofentimes 
having fewer highly educated 
professional workers than less-afected 
areas. 
Put together, the long-term impacts 
on employment are greater than 
those on population, and thus the 
employment rate—the share of people 
with jobs—also sufers long-term 
declines in areas that experienced more 
severe recessions. We illustrate this 
pattern in Figure 2, which shows these 
declines for each recession. For each 
panel, the two vertical lines indicate the 
beginning and end of the recession (in 
terms of employment). Tat the thick 
blue line is near 0 before the recession 
indicates that areas have similar trends 
in the employment rate, regardless of 
how large their employment losses 
Figure 2  In Every Recession, Harder-Hit Areas Sufer Persistent Declines in 
Employment Rates 
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NOTE: Figure shows, separately for each recession, the impact of a 1 percent greater employment loss during a 
recession (between the vertical lines) on the employment rate over time. Complete recovery is reached when the 
solid blue line returns to 0. Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confdence intervals. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional data (employment) and Surveillance, 
Epidemiology, and End Results data (population). 
will be. In each case, as expected, the area of 150,000 workers, that’s 1,500 to 
employment rate falls sharply during 3,000 fewer people with jobs. 
the recession. Tis decline persists, 
Policy Implications however, once the recession is over: 
for the 1973–1975, 1990–1991, and Te long-term impacts of local 
2001 recessions, there appears to recessions also afect income, and 
be no recovery at all, while there is we estimate that in badly hit areas, 
only incomplete recovery for the long-term per capita earnings are 
1980–1982 and 2007–2009 recessions. between 1 and 5 percent lower than 
Consequently, areas that lost 5 percent they would have been in the absence 
more of their employment during a of the recession. Tese losses are 
recession have employment rates 1–2 disproportionately borne by residents 
percentage points lower, even up to a in the bottom half of the earnings 
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from Recessions 
What explains these long-term 
impacts? We are actively working on 
this question, but at a fundamental 
level, employment opportunities shif 
across areas more quickly than people 
do. 
Altogether, our research indicates 
that recessions produce enduring 
economic disruptions to local 
economies, and this pattern has 
existed for at least the past fve 
Recessions produce enduring
economic disruptions to
local economies, and this
pattern has existed for at least
the past fve decades. 
decades. Consequently, recessions 
likely play a role in the shif of 
economic activity across places over 
time; this, in turn, has implications 
for economic opportunity for people 
who grow up in areas badly hit— 
especially repeatedly—by recessions. 
Te social safety net meant to deal 
with cyclical, temporary labor 
market disruption—unemployment 
insurance, SNAP (food stamps), and 
one-time cash grants—has not, in 
the past, led areas to recover. Instead, 
public policy may need to come up 
with more extensive and longer-term 
programs to help workers improve 
their skills, help businesses retool, 
and, more broadly, help communities 
reinvest in economic development. 
Financial support for this project was provided by the
U.S. Department of Labor Scholars Program. 
Brad J. Hershbein is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute, and Bryan A. Stuart is an






Joshua D. Hawley 
In the frst half of 2020, more 
than 40 million people fled an initial 
unemployment insurance claim, and 
according to the U.S. Department of 
Labor, over 33 million people were 
collecting benefts—both all-time 
highs (see Figure 1). As a result of 
COVID-19 and its efect on the 
economy, nearly every county in the 
United States experienced record 
unemployment growth in April, with 
little improvement since. 
Strengthening Workforce Data 
Is Critical 
To address such rampant 
unemployment, policymakers 
require more powerful and more 
robust employment data systems 
than currently exist. In my role as a 
professor and researcher at the Ohio 
State University, I worked with state 
agencies and academic colleagues 
to build a longitudinal data system 
linking information from education, 
workforce development, and social 
services. Te linked data have 
allowed researchers in government 
and academia to study the impact of 
individual outcomes for public policies, 
such as employment or education. Te 
book Data Science in the Public Interest: 
Improving Government Performance in 
the Workforce, recently published by 
the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7 for more 
details), describes how state-specifc 
data systems like the one in Ohio can 
help us improve the capacity to address 
challenges such as the rapid increases 
in unemployment (Hawley 2020). 
I recommend four specifc steps: 
1) Increase the use of administrative 
records in employment statistics. 
2) Better fund workforce data system 
infrastructure. 
3) Explore partnerships with private 
organizations that have signifcant 
data on the labor force. 
4) Build on the partnerships between 
universities and states to make use 
of these data, especially to focus 
attention on inequalities in the 
labor market. 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented challenge for federal and state data 
systems needed to design policy responses. 
n States cannot improve their systems on their own but need federal investment and 
collaboration with outside partners.
n Cloud computing and tiered access to data offer efficiency advantages, but both 
the federal and many state systems need technology modernization for the shift to 
happen.
n Partnerships with universities are critical to ensuring that data systems are used 
to their full potential to solve social problems, including racial inequality in labor 
markets.
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Increase Use of Administrative Records 
Each month, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics releases employment 
statistics based on two surveys, the 
household-based Current Population 
Survey (CPS) and the business-based 
Current Employment Survey (CES). 
Tere are signifcant strengths to 
these two surveys. Tey ask detailed 
questions allowing granular analysis, 
and (between the two) their scope 
is broad, covering nearly all types of 
employment.  However, the sample 
sizes are still limited, with the CPS 
surveying some 60,000 of the more than 
120 million households in the country, 
and the CES capturing 145,000 frms 
relative to the more than 10 million 
business establishments. Moreover, 
these surveys sufer from nonresponse. 
In a good month, some 15 percent of 
sampled households refuse to complete 
the CPS survey. During the COVID-19 
crisis, the overall CPS nonresponse 
rate has grown to over one-third, with 
similar if smaller increases for the CES. 
Since we do not know whether this 
nonresponse is random, it is difcult to 
understand whether the information 
collected is completely representative of 
the entire U.S. labor market. 
more detailed, if less timely, statistics 
than those allowed by surveys. 
Additionally, several individual states
increasingly use their unemployment 
insurance systems for research and 
evaluation of their own labor markets, 
sometimes in conjunction with other 
states. One such efort is through the 
Coleridge Initiative (see sidebar). 
Invest in Administrative Data Capacity 
State workforce data systems are 
aging. Many states still run their 
unemployment insurance systems 
on old sofware and computer 
equipment—some that are 40 years 
old. A well-publicized efort in 
April aimed to recruit programmers 
familiar with old computer languages 
systems, such as COBOL. A decade 
ago, the National Association of State 
Workforce Agencies identifed the 
long-term neglect of computer systems 
as a key barrier to resiliency, reporting 
that states simply could not handle the 
demands of claims during the Great 
Recession (let alone the current one). 
The Coleridge Initiative 
States ofen need to share 
workforce data to solve pressing 
economic and social problems— 
like an economic recession 
or natural disaster such as 
COVID-19—while preserving 
privacy and state autonomy 
over their own records. Te 
Coleridge Initiative is a nonproft
organization that maintains 
state administrative data with 
cutting-edge, cloud-based security 
protocols (the FedRamp standard), 
granting access to specifc, 
approved projects. Te initiative 
also ofers training courses to state 
and university analysts, providing 
a context to use the data in the 
public interest. (Te author is a 
collaborator on the Coleridge 
Initiative.) 
Te problems have grown as the federal 
government has reduced funding for
helping states maintain their systems. 
Figure 1  U.S. Unemployment Insurance Claims, 2007–2020   
Fortunately, administrative 
data—data collected for the 
administration of certain government 
25 7 
0 
Great Recession peak 
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All-time high 
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Workforce Data (and Knowledge) under Pressure 
Tese issues could be rectifed with 
additional funding and stafng support 
from both state and federal sources, 
as there is already agreement on best 
practices. Additionally, greater support 
could also expand the usefulness of 
Nearly every county in the
United States experienced record
unemployment growth in April,
with little improvement since. 
the data, such as providing linkages to 
employees of the federal government 
(not currently covered by state 
unemployment systems) or providing 
additional worker detail, such as 
demographics and occupation and job 
title. 
Private Sector Data 
Employers, schools, and workforce 
providers ofen store their data 
with a wide range of private sector 
vendors. For example, payroll frms, 
such as ADP, maintain records on 
employment, pay, and benefts for 
a wide range of organizations, and 
ofen include information not in 
unemployment insurance records, 
such as occupation and rate of pay. 
Many states still run their
unemployment insurance systems
on old software and
computer equipment—some
that are 40 years old.
Credit bureaus, such as Equifax, 
track individual credit information 
and loan repayment history based on 
business fnancial transactions. Because 
companies submit these data as they 
are processed, records are more up to 
date than resources from the federal or 
state governments. Payroll and credit 
frms have typically sold access to these 
data to employers and other businesses, 
but they are increasingly being used 
by researchers on an anonymized 
basis, such as the Opportunity 
Insights economic recovery tracker. 
Furthermore, although use of private 
data still faces legal hurdles, there 
are new examples from California of
statewide eforts to use anonymized 
credit data for public policy. 
Partnerships to Improve Capacity and 
Focus on Inequities 
Te most pressing needs to 
improve data systems are not technical 
resources—rather, human resources 
are needed to create an efective 
governance structure for assembling, 
sharing, and analyzing the data (Lane 
2020). Limits in existing human 
capital—ofen due to limited budgets— 
mean that simple automated reporting 
takes the place of sophisticated 
analyses. Diagnosing the current crisis 
in unemployment, and understanding 
why, for example, African Americans 
and women face greater challenges, 
requires new operation models. One 
such new model is through greater 
partnership with state universities. 
Ohio, for instance, has partnered with 
the Ohio State University to expand 
its research and analysis capacity 
(Hawley 2020), and California has 
similar eforts underway through the 
California Policy Lab at the University 
of California Berkeley and Los Angeles 
campuses. Te collaboration with 
state government has led to greater 
use of data for dashboards, such as the 
Workforce Success Measures and the
Workforce Data Tools. Te investments 
in data science have given us the ability 
during the COVID-19 pandemic 
to pivot quickly to dashboards on 
unemployment and food security. 
Tese partnerships are increasingly 
regional—the Midwest states, for 
example, collaborate on data analysis. 
Conclusion 
Te current unemployment crisis 
drives home the weaknesses in state 
workforce systems. State administrative 
data are increasingly important to 
workforce policy decision-making 
and help compensate for limitations 
in existing survey-based data. Most 
states sit on a wealth of valuable data 
that unfortunately are siloed, and 
they have few resources with which to 
analyze the data to promote sound and 
efective public policy. With relatively 
small increases in funding, however, 
substantial improvements in the quality 
and timeliness of workforce data are 
possible, including supplementing 
administrative data with data collected 
by the private sector. Additionally, 
partnerships, such as the one between 
the Ohio State University and state 
and local governments, help leverage 
existing resources more cost-efectively, 
and provide examples for how other 
states can better understand labor 
market changes during crises and 
policies to address them. 
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New Book from the Upjohn Press 
Data Science in the Public Interest 
Improving Government Performance in the Workforce 
Joshua D. Hawley 
Governments accumulate 
a lot of data on residents, 
especially those who 
participate in some 
form of social insurance 
program. But what do 
they use these data for? 
Do they use the data in a 
manner that is efcient 
and helps the most 
people? And are there 
better ways to use the data? These are the key questions 
addressed in this new book from the Upjohn Press. 
Hawley begins by describing governments’ various 
workforce programs and how public policy afects 
the data development systems. He then provides an 
overview of how governments currently use data to help 
in decision making and federal and state performance 
management systems. He ofers specifc examples 
of technical structures used to provide data to state 
performance management systems in the workforce 
area, focusing on those of Ohio and Washington. A 
discussion of the legal and governance issues that arise 
when a state establishes a data system follows. 
Hawley also discusses technical developments 
that states have made in performance management 
systems for workforce development and explains 
three examples: scorecards, dashboards, and data 
visualizations. 
Overall, Hawley brings to light new ways government 
is using tools to inform decisions about the workforce 
at the state and local levels. He moves beyond 
standardized performance metrics designed to meet 
federal agency requirements and discusses how 
governments use tools that can provide up-to-date 
information for decision makers. 
Read the introductory chapter. 
$25 pbk. ISBN 978-088099-674-7  150 pp. 2020. 
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